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REGULATION OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
American banks recently have begun to offer securities services that banks
previously have not provided.I Traditionally, banks have offered only limited
securities services since the Glass-Steagall Act2 prohibited commercial banks
I. See Securities Indus. Ass'n, Public Policy Issues Raised by Bank Securities Activities,
20 SAN Din:ro L. REv. 339, 339 (1983) (recently banks have increased their securities activities)
[hereinafter cited as Policy Issues]; Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Com-
ptroller's New Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69 VA. L. REy. 1303, 1313 (1983) (banks have
expanded brokerage services over last decade and hundreds of banks have offered discount brokerage
service since 1982) [hereinafter cited as Comptroller's New Reading]. The Glass-Steagall Act has
always permitted banks to perform accommodation transactions where the bank purchases securities
for the account of customers of the bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982) (bank may purchase
or sell securities without recourse upon order for account of bank's customer); infra note 2 (discus-
sion of Glass-Steagall Act). The Glass-Steagall Act also allows banks to both underwrite and
purchase for their own account United States government obligations and state and municipal
government obligations. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982). Recently, however, banks have begun to
offer sophisticated investment services to their customers. See Policy Issues, supra, at 347-52 (discus-
sion of securities activities of banks). For example, banks manage and control the investment
activities for pension funds and for individual trusts and estates. See id. at 348. Banks also offer
dividend reinvestment plans which permit banks to pool the dividends of bank customers to pur-
chase additional shares of stock for the customers' accounts. See id. Furthermore, banks provide
investment advice to corporate customers and often fund long-term corporate debt. See id. at 850.
More recently, numerous banks have entered the discount brokerage field. See Comptroller's
New Reading, supra, at 1313 (hundreds of banks have recently entered discount brokerage business).
A discount broker merely executes, clears, and settles customer securities orders for a lower price
than full service brokers. See id. n.65. A discount broker does not provide a securities customer
with investment advice. See id. Banks have begun to offer discount brokerage through contrac-
tual agreements with discount brokerage firms, or by operating discount brokerage services as
affiliates or subsidiaries of banks. See id. at 1313; Note, A Banker's Adventures in Brokerland:
Looking Through Glass-Steagall at Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 1498, 1499-1500
(1983) (several banks have recently entered discount brokerage business) [hereinafter cited as Banker's
Adventures]. Several bank holding companies have acquired discount brokerage houses and now
operate the discount brokerages services as affiliates of the bank holding companies. See Com-
ptroller's New Reading, supra, at 1314-15 (numerous bank holding companies have acquired dis-
count brokerages or have contracted to provide customers discount brokerage services). National
banks also have moved to offer discount brokerage services, either through an affiliation with
an existing discount brokerage house, or by organizing a discount brokerage service as a sub-
sidiary of the national bank. See Banker's Adventures, supra, at 1500 n.9 (national banks recent-
ly have entered discount brokerage business); see also infra note 6 (legal debate continues concern-
ing whether bank discount brokerage is permissible).
2. Glass-Steagall Act, Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C); see 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (national banks may engage in only limited securities
activities); id. § 377 (1982) (Federal Reserve member bank may not affiliate with corporation
principally engaged in investment banking); id. § 378 (1982) (investment banking organization
prohibited from accepting most deposits); id. § 78 (1982) (management and ownership ties be-
tween banks and investment firms prohibited). Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933
in response to sentiments that the involvement of banks in securities activities had contributed
to the financial collapse of the stock market and the ensuing depression. See 75 CONG. REc.
9887 (1932) (statement of Senator Glass). Although Congress recognized certain advantages to
bank involvement in the securities market, such as increased competition and convenience for
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from engaging in many of the securities activities of broker-dealers. 3 Recent-
ly, however, banks have expanded their securities activities by offering securities
bank customers, Congress believed that the hazards of commercial bank involvement in securities
speculation outweighed any advantages to bank participation in the securities business. See S.
Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1933). Congress, therefore, prohibited national banks and
state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System from engaging in certain securities
activities such as underwriting corporate stocks and bonds. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982) (banks
may engage in only limited securities activities and may not underwrite corporate securities); see
also infra note 3 (explanation of Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions on bank securities activities).
See generally, Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BAnNo
L.J. 483, 497-528 (1971) (discussion of history of Glass-Steagall Act); Comptroller's New Reading,
supra note 1, at 1306-13 (history of Glass-Steagall Act and bank securities activities).
3. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 377, 378 (1982) (prohibitions on bank securities activities). Con-
gress intended the Glass-Steagall Act to prohibit commercial bank involvement in the securities
business. See 75 CoNG. Rc. 9912 (remarks of Senator Bulkley) (Act prohibits bank involvement
in securities business); see also, Pitt & Williams, The Glass-SteagallAct; Key Issues for the Financial
Services Industry, 11 Sac. REG. L.J. 234, 237 (1983) (Glass-Steagall Act is barrier between com-
bination of commercial and investment banking business); Note, A Conduct Oriented Approach
to Glass-Steagall, 91 YmE L.J. 102, 103 (1981) (Congress intended the Glass-Steagall Act to separate
commercial banking from promotional securities activities) [hereinafter cited as Conduct Oriented
Approach]. Congressional desires to separate commercial banking from investment banking came
as the result of fears that the interaction of commercial banking with the securities business caused
dangerous conditions that had lead to financial instability both in banking and in the securities
market. In Investment Company Institute v. Camp, the Supreme Court addressed the dangers
of bank and securities business interaction that Congress perceived when Congress enacted the
Glass-Steagall Act. See 401 U.S. 617, 630-34 (1971). In Camp, the Supreme Court examined
the legality of a bank operation of an open-ended investment fund under the Glass-Steagall Act.
See id. at 619; 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982) (prohibition on banks selling securities). In finding that
the fund violated the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions against banks selling securities, the Court
discussed the potential hazards of commercial bank securities activities which led Congress to
enact the Glass-Steagall Act's prohibitions on commercial bank involvement in investment bank-
ing. See 401 U.S. at 630-34. First, the Court noted that a bank investing its own assets in a
risky security investment was dangerous because the bank's stability might depend on the success
of the security investment. See id. at 630. Second, the Court stated that bank securities affiliates
presented dangers to the financial stability of the banking and securities markets. See id. For
example, the Court noted a bank might be tempted to make imprudent loans to the affiliate
if the affiliate experienced financial troubles. See id. at 631. Moreover, the Court maintained
that if a bank affiliate experienced financial difficulty, the public would associate the difficulty
with the bank and the public could lose confidence in the bank. See id. Additionally, the Court
recognized that a danger exists that a bank might loan a customer money to enable the customer
to invest in securities that the bank underwrote or promoted. See id. at 632. Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that banks might loan money more freely to companies whose securities the bank
holds or underwrites. See id. at 631. Finally, the Camp Court contended that a bank should
provide its customers with disinterested investment advice, and that a bank's affiliation with a
securities brokerage business could result in a conflict with the bank's duty because the bank
might encourage investments in firms associated with its securities affiliate. See id. at 633.
Congress enacted the various section of the Glass-Steagall Act to separate commercial banking
and investment banking and prevent the types of financial hazards of bank involvement in the
securities business that the Camp Court cited. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act (section 16)
prohibits national banks from engaging in substantial securities activities by limiting national
bank securities powers generally to the purchase and sale of securities without recourse for the
account and only upon the order of bank customers. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982) (limitations
of national bank securities activities). Although § 16 generally prohibits national banks from
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services that arguably do not violate the Glass-Steagall Act.' Consequently,
banks have increased their securities activities to include securities services that
resemble closely the securities services of broker-dealers.5 While a debate con-
tinues with respect to the limits of permissible bank securities activity under
the Glass-Steagall Act,6 an equally important issue concerns the appropriate
regulation of the securities activities that banks perform.'
underwriting securities or purchasing securities for the bank's own account, § 16 does permit
banks to underwrite or purchase for their own account United States Treasury obligations, general
state and municipal bonds, and obligations of some specified government agencies. See id. Sec-
tion 5(c) of the Glass-Steagall Act makes the Act's prohibitions on selling, underwriting, or holding
of investment securities by national banks applicable to state chartered banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982). Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act
(Section 21) prohibits any organization engaged in a list of securities activities such as under-
writing or selling stocks and bonds from simultaneously accepting deposits. See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)
(1982). Section 21 applies not only to national banks and state member banks, but also to any
entity that engages in the commercial activities of receiving deposits subject to withdrawal by
the customer. See id. Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act bars any national or member bank
from affiliating with any entity principally engaged in the investment banking or securities business.
See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
4. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (banks now engage in extensive securities
activities). But cf. infra note 6 and accompanying text (legal battle continues over legality of
bank securities activities).
5. See Applicability of Broker-Dealer Registration to Banks [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 83,445, at 86,327 (Nov. 8, 1983) (banks provide investment services that are functionally
indistinguishable from services registered broker-dealers offer) [hereinafter cited as SEC Bank
Registration Proposal]; supra note 2 (banks securities services resemble services of broker-dealers).
6. See Banker's Adventures, supra note 1, at 1500-01 (securities industry contesting banks
entry in new securities fields). In January 1983, the Federal Reserve Board allowed the Bank America
Company to acquire a discount brokerage firm, Charles Schwab & Co., as a subsidiary of the
bank holding company. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
716 F.2d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1983) (court examined litigation concerning bank holding company dis-
count brokerage service), petition for cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3545 (Jan. 24, 1984). The Securities
Industry Association (SIA), however, brought an action against the Federal Reserve Board claim-
ing that the operation of a discount brokerage subsidiary of a bank holding company violated
the Glass-Steagall Act because the bank holding company impermissibly engaged in the invest-
ment banking business. See id. at 94-100 (SIA's Glass-Steagall claims and court's analysis of
claims). The United States Second Circuit in Securities Indus. Ass'n, ruled that the bank holding
company discount brokerage subsidiary was permissible under the Glass-Steagall Act. See id.
The propriety of a bank holding company discount brokerage business, however, now awaits
resolution by the United States Supreme Court. See Supreme Court to Review Fed Approval
of BankAmerica's Purchase of Schwab, 16 SEC. RaG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 4 at 162-63 (Jan.
27, 1984) (discussion of claims raised in litigation).
The propriety of national banks offering discount brokerage services also is in question.
See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, No. 82-2865 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 1983)
(national banks may establish discount brokerage services but not across state lines). In addition
to discount brokerage, a debate continues with respect to other securities services that banks
permissibly may offer. The SIA, for example, has challenged the Comptroller of the Currency's
decision that a national bank may offer an investment advisory service through a subsidiary.
See SIA Challenges OCC Approval of Bank's Broker, Investment Adviser Subsidiaries, 15 SEc.
RE. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 48 at 2236-37 (Dec. 9, 1983).
7. See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text (disparity in regulation between bank and
broker-dealer securities activities fosters divergent views on appropriate regulation).
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Presently, banks and broker-dealers are subject to different regulatory
schemes that may result in inadequate regulation of bank securities activities.8
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 9 regulates the securities
activities of broker-dealers by requiring the registration and regulation of
brokers 0 and dealers" with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).' 2
Sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act, however, expressly exempt
banks from the definitions of both broker and dealer. 13 The Exchange Act,
therefore, does not require banks offering securities services that resemble the
services registered broker-dealers provide to register with the SEC.' 4 Conse-
quently, banks are not subject to the same scheme of regulation as the SEC
imposes on broker-dealers.' 5 Bank securities activities, nonetheless, are sub-
ject to regulation by the federal and state banking agencies.' 6 The various
8. See infra notes 22-55 and accompanying text (disparity in regulations on bank and broker-
dealer securities activities).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)
regulates the trading of securities through control of the exchange and the over-the-counter securities
market. See L. Loss, FUNDA MTAlS OF SEcuarrms REGULATION 39 (1983). The Exchange Act
accomplishes regulation of the securities market through self-regulation by the securities industry
under the general regulatory authority of the SEC. See id. at 40. All brokers-dealers must register
with the SEC thereby becoming subject to the rules promulgated under the Exchange Act regulating
broker-dealer securities activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982) (registration and regulation of brokers
and dealers).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982) (broker is person effecting securities transactions for accounts
of others, but does not include bank).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(5) (1982) (dealer is person buying or selling securities for his own
account but does not include bank).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1982) (registration and regulation of brokers and dealers with SEC).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1982) (definitions of broker and dealer); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a), (b) (1982) (bank is national bank, Federal Reserve member bank, or state bank-
ing institution receiving deposits and exercising fiduciary powers similar to national banks). Sec-
tion 78e(a)(4) of the Exchange Act defines "broker" as a person engaged in the securities business
of effecting transactions for accounts other than the broker's own account, but expressly ex-
cludes any bank. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982) (definition of broker). Similarly, all banks
are specifically excluded from the Exchange Act's definition of a dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)
(1982) (definition of a dealer). The Exchange Act, therefore, excludes banks from the SEC's
regulatory scheme because the Act requires only brokers and dealers to register with the SEC.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982) (brokers and dealers must register with the SEC); infra note 10 (banks
excluded from definition of broker); infra note 11 (banks excluded from definition of dealer).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1982) (only brokers and dealers must register with the SEC);
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1982) (banks excluded from definitions of broker and dealer).
15. See supra note 13 (banks are not subject to same regulatory scheme as broker-dealers
since banks are exempt from SEC registration).
16. See C. GoIamBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 15-19 (1983) (discus-
sion of federal agencies regulating banks). The primary agencies responsible for the regulation
of the financial industry in the United States include the Comptroller of the Currency (Com-
ptroller), the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) and the fifty state banking departments. See id. at 15-16. The Comptroller has primary
responsibility for the regulation of federally chartered national banks. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-24,
26-27 (1982) (defining Comptroller's powers and responsibilities). The Federal Reserve is respon-
sible for overseeing bank holding companies and state chartered banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982) (Federal Reserve responsible for regula-
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banking agencies impose fewer and less comprehensive regulations on bank
securities activities than the regulations that the SEC imposes on
broker-dealers. I7 As banks continue to offer diverse securities services in com-
petition with the traditional broker-dealer, the interest of assuring securities
investors maximum protection requires modifications in existing laws and
regulations to provide uniform regulation of comparable bank and broker-
dealer securities activities.'" Groups concerned with the regulation of bank
securities activities have offered various proposals to rectify the problem of
inadequate regulation of bank securities activities.' 9
The securities industry and the banking industry disagree with respect to
the necessity of a change in bank securities regulation.2" The securities industry
contends that the regulation of broker-dealers by the SEC is more burden-
tion of bank holding companies), 12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 324-25 (1982) (Federal Reserve regulates
state banks electing to join Federal Reserve System). The FDIC regulates state banks that are
not Federal Reserve System members but that have federal deposit insurance. See 12 U.S.C. §§
1815, 1817 (1982). Additionally, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) regulates federal
savings and loan associations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982) (FHLBB responsible for regulation
of thrifts).
17. See Banker's Adventures, supra note 1, at 1530-32 (disparities exists between regula-
tions of bank and broker-dealer services especially with respect to training of securities personnel,
advertising, and margin loan regulation); infra notes 22-52 and accompanying text (disparities
in regulation of bank and broker-dealer securities regulation).
18. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (disparity of regulatory schemes of bank
and broker-dealer securities activities requires changes to establish uniformity of regulation).
19. See, e.g., S. 1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposed Financial Institutions Deregula-
tion Act); SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,325-29. (SEC's proposed rule
3b-9); NASD NOTICE TO MEmERS 83-72 (Dec. 20, 1983) (proposed amendment to NASD By-
Laws). The Treasury Department supports congressional legislation designed to expand permissi-
ble bank securities activities while equalizing the regulations on broker-dealers and banks offer-
ing similar securities services. See S. 1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); infra notes 62-82 and
accompanying text (discussion of proposed legislation). Since Congress has failed to amend ex-
isting securities regulations, the SEC has proposed a rule modifying the definition of "bank"
under the Exchange Act. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,325-29 (SEC's
proposed rule 3b-9); infra notes 86-133 and accompanying text (discussion of proposed rule).
Under proposed rule 3b-9 a financial institution engaging in certain securities activities would
no longer be termed a bank and, therefore, would have to register with the SEC and be subject
to the same rules and regulations applicable to broker-dealers. See SEC Bank Registration Pro-
posal, supra note 5, at 86,326; infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (bank performing certain
securities activities required to register with SEC under proposed rule 3b-9); see also infra notes
125-32 and accompanying text (SEC's proposed rule 3b-9 is positive response to disparate regula-
tion of bank and broker-dealer securities activities absent congressional action). The National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) has proposed an amendment to the organization's By-
Laws that would require certain employees of financial institutions with contractual arrangements
with broker-dealers to register as representatives with the NASD and be subject to NASD rules
and qualification standards. See NASD NoTIcE, supra, at 1-4; infra notes 134-47 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of NASD proposal); see also infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text
(NASD's proposal would help provide equivalent regulation of bank and broker-dealer securities
activities).
20. Compare infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (securities industry contends major
change in bank securities regulation necessary) with infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text
(banking industry believes present regulatory scheme adequate).
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some than the regulation that the various banking agencies place on bank
securities activities.2 The securities industry claims that the Exchange Act places
strict and complex regulations on broker-dealers to assure investor protection,
and that the absence of equivalent regulatiofis of bank securities activities results
in inadequate protection for bank securities customers. 22 For example, a broker-
dealer registered with the SEC is subject to rules regulating the broker-dealer's
training and competency.23 The securities industry claims that without similar
regulations on bank securities personnel a bank securities customer might receive
inadequate investment information from a bank employee who is not as com-
petent as a broker-dealer.24 In addition to competency regulations, the Exchange
Act requires broker-dealers to supervise their personnel.25 The Exchange Act
also provides different margin loan regulations for banks and broker-dealers.26
21. See Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BAxNmn L.J. 611, 616-19 (1974)
(banks subject to less burdensome regulation than broker-dealers); Policy Issues, supra note 1,
at 357-60 (less burdensome regulation of bank securities activities gives banks advantages in securities
services).
22. See Policy Issues, supra note 1, at 358-59 (investors inadequately protected because
banks not subject to same regulations as broker-dealers); infra notes 23-32 & 50-52 and accompa-
nying text (disparate regulations imposed on bank and broker-dealer securities activities).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1982) (brokers and dealers must meet qualification stan-
dards established by SEC); NASD MaAUL (CCH) 1 102A, at 1052, 1055 (Schedule C of NASD
By-Laws requires that representatives pass qualification examination); 2 NEw YoRK STocK
EXCHAoE GUIDE 2304 (1983) (New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rule 304A requiring members
to pass qualification examination). Broker-dealers are subject to numerous regulations of several
agencies. Broker-dealers must register with the SEC and adhere to the requirements imposed by
the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982) (all brokers and dealers required to register with
SEC). Additionally, § 6(a) of the Exchange Act provides that in order for a national securities
exchange to receive registration, the exchange must enact rules to assure fair dealing between
brokers and their customers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1982) (registered exchange must enact
rules of fairness). Exchange members must comply with the exchange's rules and are subject
to disciplinary action for violation of the exchange's rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(6) (disciplinary
action for exchange members who violate rules). Moreover, broker-dealers participating in over-
the-counter transactions also must become members of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD). See NASD MANUAL (CCH) 102, at 110 (membership in NASD permits firm
to participate in over-the-counter securities business). NASD members are subject to strict rules
and regulations concerning qualifications and standards of proper conduct. See id. at 110-11.
24. See Policy Issues, supra note 1, at 359 (disparities in regulation of banks and broker-
dealers including broker training affords less protection to investors of securities through banks).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1982).
26. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d)(D) (1982) (regulation of bank margin loans only applies
to stock purchase loan but not loans for nonequity security purchases) with 15 U.S.C. § 78(g)(c)(1)
(1982) (regulation of brokerage margin loans applies to loan for purchase or maintenance of
any security). Generally, margin loans regulations are restrictions placed on banks and broker-
dealers with respect to permissible loans made to investors for the purchase of securities. See
id. The regulations applicable to bank loans and broker-dealer loans vary considerably. For example,
broker-dealers may not make unsecured loans to investors for the purchase of securities. See
12 C.F.R. § 220.9(a)(3) (1983). When broker-dealers make loans for the purchase of securities,
the investor must pledge certain other securities as collateral. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1982). Banks,
however, may make unsecured loans for the purchase of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1982)
(banks not prohibited from making unsecured loan to purchase securities). Banks also may accept
any security as collateral for loans made for the purchase of securities. See id.
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Moreover, the securities industry places rules on broker-dealers that do not
apply to banks such as rules requiring broker-dealers to review the transactions
of their employees and make periodic examinations of customer accounts to
be certain that the broker-dealers and their employees do not violate the
federal securities laws. 27 Additionally, broker-dealers are subject to strict
rules regulating advertising,28 bonding requirements, 2' confirmation, 30 and
recordkeeping. 3' Finally, broker-dealers may only recommend investments that
are suitable for a customer in light of the investor's objectives and financial
situation. 32 The securities industry claims that the rules regulating broker-dealers
protect investors and that bank customers receive less protection in their
securities transactions since banks are not subject to the same regulations. 33
The securities industry also contends that the disparity in regulation between
banks and broker-dealers results in an unfair competitive advantage for banks
because banks sell securitiqs under a more lenient regulatory scheme. 31 Conse-
quently, the securities industry contends that bank securities activities should
be subject to the same regulatory scheme as the SEC imposes on the securities
activities of broker-dealers .
3
Although the banking industry acknowledges that some differences in
securities regulation exist between banks and broker-dealers, the banking in-
27. See NASD MANuAL (CCH) 12177, at 2109 (1983) (NASD rule requiring members supervise
employees); 2 NYSE GuImE (CCH) 2342.16, at 3586-87 (1983) (Exchange members must super-
vise employees and examine customer accounts); id. 2405, at 3697 (members must supervise
all accounts handled by registered representatives).
28. See AmiR. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 9490, at 2683 (1983) (broker-dealers' advertisements
must be of legitimate business character); id. 9491A, at 2683 (1983) (member firm's advertising
must be approved by a member); 2 NYSE GtnME (CCH) 2472, 2474A, 2479B (1983) (restrictions
on unfair or misleading advertising by broker-dealers); NASD MANuAL (CCH) 2195, at 2109-38
(NASD's Rules of Fair Practice governing advertising).
29. See 17 C.F.R. 240.15b10-1 (1983) (some broker-dealers who are not NASD members
required to post blanket fidelity bond converting officers and employees of broker-dealer); NASD
MANUAL (CCH) 2182, 2182A, at 2109-13-2109-15 (1983) (NASD members must post fidelity
bond covering officers and employees).
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (1983) (broker-dealers must send written confirmations for
securities transactions complying with detailed requirements).
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-6 (1983) (nonmember broker must keep records on customer
accounts and all securities transactions).
32. See NASD MANuAL (CCH) 2152, at 2051 (1983) (NASD suitability rule). The NASD
suitability rule requires that all NASD members must have reasonable grounds to believe that
a recommendation that the NASD member gives his customer is an investment that is suitable
for the customer in light of the customer's financial situation and needs. See id.; 17 C.F.R. §
240.15bi0-3 (1983) (nonmember broker-dealers may only recommend securities suitable for
customer's needs).
33. See Policy Issues, supra note 1, at 358-59 (advantageous bank regulations afford fewer
protections to bank securities customers than to broker-dealer customers).
34. See id. at 356-60 (economic advantages given to banks as result of disparity in regulation).
35. See id. at 359-60 (significant bank securities activities should be regulated by the SEC);
see also Securities Activities of Depository Institution: Hearings on S. 1720 Before the Subcomm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-12 (1982) (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of Treasury) (banks and nonbank
brokers should be subject to equal regulation) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings].
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dustry contends that the present regulatory scheme is sufficient because the
banking agencies' regulation of bank securities activities is similar to SEC
regulation of broker-dealer securities activities.36 For example, banks and
broker-dealers must comply with similar record examination regulations17 and
similar regulations protecting customers against loss of securities through theft
or insolvency." Moreover, the securities activities of banks, like the securities
activities of broker-dealers, are within the coverage of the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. 9 Consequently, the banking industry prefers
to leave the regulation of bank securities activities under the present regulatory
scheme of the federal banking agencies.
40
In support of the banking industry's view that the current regulatory
scheme is sufficient, the banking industry relies on a 1977 study of the regula-
tion of bank securities activities conducted by the SEC (Bank Study).4' In
the Bank Study, the SEC rejected a proposal to delete the bank exclusion
from the definitions of broker and dealer in the Exchange Act and thereby
require banks offering securities services to register with the SEC. 42 The Bank
Study concluded that although some changes aimed at improving the regula-
36. See Bank Automatic Investment Services [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. BAcmG
L. REP. (CCH) 196,272, at 81,362 (1974) (letter from Comptroller James E. Smith to G. Duane
Veith) (Comptroller contended that bank securities activities are subject to regulations different
from but as strict as broker-dealer regulations).
37. See 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1982) (bank must report on bank's condition disclosing resources
and liabilities to Comptroller of Currency); id. § 164 (1982) (bank's failure to report subjects
bank to liability); id. § 481 (1982) (bank examiners report on banks condition periodically).
38. See 12 U.S.C. § 1881-84 (1982) (banks required to install security devices to prevent
theft); Spencer, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities: The Effects of the SEC Bank Study,
95 BANKING L.J. 616, 624 (1978) (SEC study concluded bank regulation focused on bank solvency
adequately protects banks' investors through loss from insolvency).
39. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 77j (1982) (antifraud provisions of securities laws apply to both
banks and broker-dealers).
40. See Letter from James D. Herrington to SEC 2 (Dec. 29, 1983) (comment letter from
Independent Bankers Association of America (IBAA) to SEC) (IBAA argues that SEC should
work with federal banking agencies to coordinate bank securities regulatory reform).
41. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Reports on Bank Securities Activities (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Bank Study]. See generally Spencer, supra note 38, at 616-33 (findings and
effects of Bank Study). The SEC conducted the Bank Study to analyze the securities services
that banks offered, not with a view toward detecting Glass-Steagall violations, but simply to
determine to what extent banks participated in the securities market. See id. at 617 n.2. The
purpose of the Bank Study was to determine if Congress should eliminate the bank exclusion
to the definitions of broker and dealer in the Exchange Act. See id. at 617; supra notes 11-12
(banks excluded from definitions of broker and dealer). The SEC submitted the study to Con-
gress in three separate reports containing an analysis of the extent of bank securities services,
comparing the regulations of bank and broker-dealers with respect to investor protection, and
setting forth the SEC's conclusions and recommendation. See id. at 617-18; infra note 43 (SEC's
recommendations). The SEC concluded that Congress should maintain the bank exclusion in the
definitions of broker and dealer. See Bank Study, supra, at 305. The SEC believed that regulation
of bank securities activities by the SEC would result in duplicative and burdensome regulation
on banks. See id.
42. See Bank Study, supra note 41, at 305.
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tion of bank securities activities were necessary to assure investor protection, ' 3
banking agencies should continue to be the regulators of bank securities
services. 4" The Bank Study reasoned that SEC regulation of bank securities
activities would result in duplicative regulation since bank securities activities
would be subject to both SEC regulation and continued regulation by the bank-
ing agencies.4' The Bank Study recommended that bank regulators improve
the recordkeeping and confirmation requirements of bank securities activities,
and also recommended that bank regulators adopt personal competency re-
quirements for bank securities personnel. 4 6 Although the bank regulators have
adopted the recommended changes in confirmation and recordkeeping
requirements, 47 the bank regulators have refused to adopt personal competency
standards.
4"
Despite the banking industry's arguments favoring retention of the pre-
sent regulatory scheme, disparities between bank securities regulation and
broker-dealer regulation continue to exist. 49 The securities industry correctly
43. See id. at 307. In the Bank Study the SEC recommended legislation to improve regula-
tions of bank securities activities concerning confirmations, recordkeeping, and competency of
personnel. See id. The SEC further suggested that federal banking agencies adopt improved
examination procedures to review all bank securities activities. See id. at 307-08. Finally, the
SEC recommended that federal law require the federal banking agencies to notify the SEC of
federal securities laws violations and that federal law should instruct the banking agencies to
act to assure the protection of investors. See id. at 308.
44. See id. at 305 (SEC should not regulate bank securities activities).
45. See id. (SEC regulation of bank securities activities would result in duplicative and
burdensome regulation).
46. See id. at 307.
47. See id. (SEC's recommended changes in bank confirmation and recordkeeping re-
quirements of bank securities activities). In response to the Bank Study's recommendations, the
federal banking agencies adopted regulations designed to improve the recordkeeping and confir-
mation requirements of bank securities activities. See 12 C.F.R. § 12.1-.7 (1983) (national banks
must send confirmation of securities transaction to customers and maintain customer records);
id. § 208.8(k) (1983) (state chartered Federal Reserve member banks must maintain records and
send notification of securities transactions to customers); id. § 344 (1983) (federally insured
nonmember banks must maintain adequate records and provide adequate information to customers
with respect to securities transactions). Although the banking agencies have adopted these confir-
mation and recordkeeping requirements to equalize bank and broker-dealer regulations, some
present discrepancies exist between bank and broker-dealer regulations. For example, while broker-
dealers generally must provide confirmations of securities transactions within five days of a
customer's request, federal banking law permits banks to send confirmations within a "reasonable
time" following a customer request. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(c) (1983) (broker-dealers
must send confirmation within five days of customer request) with 12 C.F.R. § 12.5(c) (1983)
(national banks may send confirmation within "reasonable time" following customer request);
12 C.F.R § 208.8(k)(4)(iii) (1983) (Federal Reserve member banks must send confirmation within
reasonable time); and 12 C.F.R. § 344.5(c) (1983) (insured nonmember bank may mail written
confirmation within reasonable time following customer request).
48. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 35, at 32 (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman)
(SEC Chairman noted that bank regulators refused to adopt competency regulations SEC recom-
mended because bank regulators believed that banks' existing examinations were adequate).
49. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text (disparities in regulation between banks
and broker-dealers).
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contends that broker-dealers are subject to regulations that provide investors
protection while the banking industry is often exempt from similar
requirements .5 For example, stock exchange rules provide that broker-dealer
advertising may not be unfair or misleading." Bank regulators place no similar
restrictions on securities advertising by banks.2 Whatever the extent of the
disparity between the regulatory schemes of the securities activities of banks
and broker-dealers, the policy of investor protection demands that if banks
and broker-dealers perform the same extensive securities services, banks and
broker-dealers should be subject to the same regulations. 3 The solution for
assuring that banks' securities services and broker-dealers are subject to the
same rules and regulations is to subject both industries to the same regulatory
scheme 4.5 Several currently proposed plans would provide for more equitable
regulation of securities services and some plans include proposals to permit
banks to offer more securities services than the Glass-Steagall Act presently
permits.
55
50. See Policy Issues, supra note 1, at 358-59 (bank securities customers receive less protec-
tion than broker-dealer customers because bank securities regulations more lenient than broker-
dealer securities regulations). The securities industry claims that the disparities in regulation be-
tween banks and broker-dealers that lead to lack of investor protection for bank securities customers
arise not only because of differences in statutory regulation, but also because of differences in
regulatory procedure and policy as applied by banking regulators and the SEC. See Banker's
Adventures, supra note 1, at 1529-30 (discrepancies in regulation arise from differences in
philosophies and objectives of regulators). For example, the SEC seeks to protect investors by
enforcing regulations on the broker's securities practices. See id. The government may impose
sanctions on broker-dealers for violations of legal or ethical standards such as recordkeeping
requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-6 (1983) (recordkeeping requirements for nonmember
brokers and dealers). Bank regulators, however, concern themselves primarily with the protection
of the stability of the banking system, not with investor protection. See Adventures in Brokerland,
supra note 1, at 1529 (aim of bank regulations is to protect depositors and assure bank solvency).
Additionally, banks enforce their regulations in private to avoid speculation on bank solvency.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) (1982) (cease and desist order hearings conducted in private unless
public hearing necessary to protect public interest). The SEC, however, enforces its regulations
publically with a view toward full disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 78v (1982) (SEC hearings may
be public). SEC procedures, therefore, provide a stronger mechanism for investor protection than
bank enforcement procedures.
51. See AMER. STOCK Exca.mE GUmE (CCH) 9490, at 2683 (1983) (broker-dealer adver-
tising must be of legitimate business character); 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2472, 2474A, 2474B,
at 4026-30 (1983) (NYSE rules prohibit broker-dealers from engaging in false or misleading
advertising).
52. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 35, at 32 (statement of John S. R. Shad, SEC Chairman)
(banking agencies do not place equivalent regulations with respect to advertising on banks as
SEC places on broker-dealers).
53. See id. (SEC chairman maintained that interest of consumer protection demanded that
banks which actively solicit securities business be subject to same regulation as SEC places on
broker-dealers).
54. See supra note 19 (proposal advanced by various agencies aimed at equalizing regula-
tions of bank and broker-dealer securities activities).
55. See id.; see also infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text (discussion of Deregulation
Act); notes 86-133 and accompanying text (discussion of SEC's proposed rule 3b-9); notes 134-58
and accompanying text (discussion of NASD's proposed By-Law's amendment).
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One proposal to the problem of disparate regulation between banks and
broker-dealers offering similar securities services, supported by the Treasury
Department, is to require banks engaging in substantial securities activities
to incorporate the securities service separate from the bank as a subsidiary
of a bank holding company.16 Since the bank exemption in the Exchange Act
applies only to banks, the separate securities entity would have to register as
a broker-dealer with the SEC." The separate entity, therefore, would be sub-
ject to the same SEC regulations as other broker-dealers.58 The Treasury
Department's proposal would allow banks to offer additional securities ser-
vices than the Glass-Steagall Act presently permits, but would require banks
offering the additional services to incorporate separately their securities facilities
as a subsidiary of a bank holding company.59 The Treasury Department believes
that legislation is necessary to expand bank securities activities so that banks
may compete more effectively with investment bankers and broker-dealers. 60
The Treasury Department, however, recognizes that any substantial securities
activity conducted by financial institutions should be subject to regulation by
the SEC to assure investor protection and uniform regulation.
Accordingly, in July 1983, the Reagan Administration submitted to Con-
56. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text (discussion of proposed Deregulation Act);
see also Banker's Adventures, supra note 1, at 1534-39 (discussion of proposed separate entity
plan similar to Treasury Department's proposal).
57. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (Deregulation Act would require bank
subsidiary to register with SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)-(6) (1982) (definitions of broker, dealer
and bank); id. § 78o (brokers and dealers required to register with SEC); supra notes 11-15 and
accompanying text (entities within definition of bank need not register with SEC since banks
excluded from definitions of broker and dealer).
58. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (Deregulation Act would subject bank holding
company subsidiary to SEC control).
59. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (Deregulation Act would require banks
to offer bank securities services through bank holding company subject to SEC regulation). A
bank holding company is simply a company that owns a controlling interest in one or more banks.
See C. GOLEmBE & D. HoLLAND, supra note 16, at 144. The Federal Reserve Board regulates
bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § 1841-50 (1982). A bank holding company may own a con-
trolling interest in a nonbank company if the holding company obtains Reserve Board approval.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) (Board may approve bank holding company acquisition of
nonbank subsidiary if subsidiary's business is closely related to banking and proper incident to
banking). Bank holding companies wishing to establish a securities affiliate, therefore, must obtain
approval from the Federal Reserve Board. See id. The Federal Reserve Board recently approved
discount brokerage as a generally permissible bank holding company subsidiary activity. See
Securities Brokerage and Margin Lending are Permissible Activities for Bank Holding Companies,
[Current] FED. BAic L. REP. (CCH) 99,715, at 87,135 (1983) (Federal Reserve places securities
brokerage on list of generally permissible bank holding company subsidiary activities).
60. See Moratorium Legislation and Financial Institutions Deregulations: Hearings on S.
1609 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
70 (1983) (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of Treasury) (legislation necessary to enable
banks to compete more effectively in financial services industry) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Hearing].
61. See id. at 76 (federal banking agencies cannot regulate effectively bank securities activities
because regulation by banking agencies would place inappropriate supervisory burden on federal
government).
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gress the Financial Institutions Deregulation Act (Deregulation Act)62 which
would allow banks to offer specific securities services enumerated in the
Deregulation Act while placing the regulation of bank securities services within
the control of the SEC and on a level with registered broker-dealers.63 Specific-
ally, the Deregulation Act would expand bank securities powers by permitting
subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in municipal
revenue bonds and sponsor and manage mutual funds. 64 Banks could only
offer the municipal revenue bond and mutual fund services through a bank
holding company subsidiary. 65 The Deregulation Act also would require banks
choosing to offer the municipal revenue bond and mutual fund services to
transfer the bank's present securities and brokerage services to the bank holding
company subsidiary." The Deregulation Act would subject a bank securities
affiliate to the regulatory scheme of the SEC because the securities affiliate
would not fall within the bank exemption to the Exchange Act's definition
of broker and dealer. 67 By subjecting the bank securities activities to the
regulatory control of the SEC, the Reagan Administration claims that the
Deregulation Act would provide equivalent regulation of banks and broker-
dealers and assure bank soundness and integrity, while allowing banks to com-
pete more effectively with broker-dealers by permitting banks to offer securities
services which federal law previously prohibited."
62. S. 1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 11, 1983).
63. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 60, at 75-78 (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary
of Treasury) (Deregulation Act permits banks to engage in additional securities activities through
bank holding company subsidiary subject to SEC regulation). The Deregulation Act would per-
mit'bank or thrift holding companies to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds and
sponsor and manage mutual funds through holding company subsidiaries. See id. at 75. Addi-
tionally, bank holding companies or their subsidiaries could underwrite and deal in insurance
and own and sell real estate. See id. The Deregulation Act also would direct the Federal Reserve
Board to promulgate regulations allowing bank holding companies to engage in additional activities
if the Federal Reserve Board determines that activities to be "of a financial nature" or closely
related to banking. See id. Under the Deregulation Act the SEC would regulate the subsidiaries
of the bank holding companies as broker-dealers. See id. at 77.
64. See id. at 75 (Deregulation Act gives banks authority to underwrite municipal revenue
bonds and sponsor mutual funds.
65. See id. at 74 (Deregulation Act only permits banks to offer new securities activities
through holding company).
66. See id. at 75. The Deregulation Act would require banks offering the additional securities
activities permitted by the Deregulation Act to do so through a securities subsidiary of a bank
holding company or through a bank holding company itself. See id. Bank holding companies
providing the additional securities services also would have to conduct presently permissible
brokerage, underwriting and dealing activities through the holding company subsidiary. See id.
Banks not engaging in the new securities activities that the Deregulation Act permits, however,
could continue to offer any securities activity presently authorized by law through the bank itself.
See id.
67. See id. at 77 (SEC would regulate securities activities of holding company subsidiaries
under Deregulation Act); supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (entity not falling within defini-
tion of bank must register with SEC because Exchange Act's definition of broker and dealer
only excludes banks).
68. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 60, at 70 (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of
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Opponents of the Deregulation Act claim that Congress intended the Glass-
Steagall Act to separate commercial bank activities from securities activities
by clearly prohibiting banks from engaging in certain securities activities.6 9
The Deregulation Act, however, would permit banks to engage in some securities
activities that the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited such as municipal revenue bond
underwriting." Opponents also argue that banks will become subject to con-
flicts of interest between their securities activities and their commercial bank-
ing functions which Congress designed the Glass-Steagall Act to alleviate. 1
For example, opponents fear that a bank that has loaned money to a com-
pany now suffering financially could assure that the company would have funds
to repay the bank by underwriting a new issue of stock for the company. 72
Finally, opponents note that the Deregulation Act will not subject all bank
securities activities to SEC regulation. 7 3 Banks choosing to offer only tradi-
tional brokerage services and securities services that the Glass-Steagall Act
-presently permits could continue to offer the securities services within the
bank. 74 Consequently, since the bank would be exempt from SEC registra-
tion, banks choosing not to offer the additional securities services that the
Deregulation Act permits could continue to operate the bank's traditional
securities services free from SEC regulation.
7 5
Supporters of the Deregulation Act claim that the proposed Act does not
violate the principles of the Glass-Steagall Act since the Act contains safeguards
against conflicts of interest between a bank and its securities affiliate.7 6 The
Deregulation Act only permits securities affiliates to engage in limited securities
activities.7 7 The Deregulation Act would not authorize securities affiliates to
Treasury) (Deregulation Act will help to equalize competition in financial services industry without
jeopardizing bank safety and soundness); see also Whittle, Financial Industry in Turmoil as Reluctant
Congress Stalls on Bank Deregulation Issue, 1983 Congressional Quarterly 1899, 1905 (1983) (Reagan
administration favors Deregulation Act to increase competition in financial services industry while
preventing unfair advantage for banks and preserving banking industry stability).
69. See Whittle, supra note 68, at 1908 (Glass-Steagall Act designed to confine bank affiliate
activities to commercial banking functions).
70. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 60, at 75 (Deregulation Act permits banks to engage
in securities activities that Glass-Steagall Act formerly prohibited).
71. See Whittle, supra note 68, at 1908 (securities industry argues that bank deregulation
would lead to same conflicts of interest between banks and their affiliates that existed in 1920's);
supra note 3 (discussion of potential conflicts and dangers of bank affiliation with securities firm).
72. See Whittle, supra note 68, at 1908 (bank underwriting securities to help failing com-
pany is one of dangers of bank participation in securities industry).
73. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 60, at 75 (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of
Treasury) (Deregulation Act would allow bank not engaging in additional securities activities to
conduct securities activities through bank without SEC regulation).
74. See id. (Deregulation Act allows bank to offer limited securities services through bank).
75. See id.; supra notes 10-13 (banks excluded from definitions of broker and dealer and
only brokers and dealers must register with SEC).
76. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 60, at 86, 103-04 (testimony of Donald T. Regan, Secretary
of Treasury) (Deregulation Act maintains line between commerce and banking and provides
safeguards against abuses that lead to Glass-Steagall Act).
77. See id. at 86 (Deregulation Act only permits banks to increase securities activities by
underwriting municipal revenue bonds and sponsoring mutual funds).
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underwrite corporate securities so that a bank could not underwrite a cor-
porate securities issue to enable a corporation to repay a loan to the bank. 78
Furthermore, supporters of the Deregulation Act claim that the Deregulation
Act would provide equivalent regulation of equivalent bank and broker-dealer
securities activities. 79 Additionally, supporters of the Deregulation Act note
that the Deregulation Act would avoid duplicative regulation of bank securities
activities since the SEC would be primarily responsible for the regulation of
bank securities services.8"
The Deregulation Act is a positive step toward creating equivalent regula-
tion of bank and broker-dealer securities activities, and would help assure com-
plete and equitable regulation of all securities services."1 Under the Deregula-
tion Act, however, banks could continue to offer a wide range of securities
services without regulation by the SEC because a bank not choosing to offer
the municipal revenue bond and mutual fund services could continue to offer
presently approved securities services, such as public discount brokerage,
through the bank.2 Equality of regulation, however, is necessary to protect
investors and prevent unfair advantages to banks even if banks do not receive
the authority to offer securities services in addition to the services that banks
presently provide.83 Any federal legislation, therefore, should assure that banks
offering substantial securities services such as banks that publically solicit
brokerage business or provide investment advice to customers, are subject to
the same regulations as the SEC imposes on broker-dealers performing similar
services."
Due to congressional disagreement concerning appropriate legislative action
with respect to bank deregulation, Congress failed to enact the Deregulation
Act. 5 In light of congressional inaction and in response to the increase in
bank securities activities the SEC proposed rule 3b-9 in 1983 to subject certain
bank securities activities to SEC regulation.8 6 The new rule would provide that
78. See id. at 104 (Deregulation Act does not permit banks to underwrite corporate securities).
79. See id. at 77 (Deregulation Act would end controversy over unequal regulatory treat-
ment of bank and broker-dealer securities activities).
80. See id. (Deregulation Act would avoid duplicative regulation since federal banking agencies
would no longer be primarily responsible for regulation of bank securities activities).
81. See id. (Deregulation Act would end controversy of unequal regulatory treatment of
bank and broker-dealer securities activities).
82. See id. at 75 (Under Deregulation Act bank choosing to offer only presently authorized
securities services could do so through bank).
83. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (SEC Chairman contends that interest of
investor protection demands equivalent regulation of bank and broker-dealer securities services).
84. See Policy Issue, supra note 1, at 359-60 (securities industry argues that SEC should
regulate increased bank securities activities in addition to broker-dealers).
85. See Banking Deregulation, 1983 Congressional Quarterly 2470-71 (1983) (Congress fail-
ed to pass Deregulation Act).
86: See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326 (SEC's proposed rule
subjects banks performing certain activities to SEC regulation); see also Definition of Bank for
Purposes of Sections 3(a)(4) and (5) oftheAct, 2 FED. Sac. L. REP. (CC) § 21,260, at 15,603-3
(Nov. 8, 1983) (text of proposed rule 3b-9).
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for purposes of the definitions of "broker" and "dealer" in sections 3(a)(4)
and 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act, the term "bank" would not apply to banks
engaging in certain securities activities. 87 Under the proposed rule, a bank that
solicits brokerage business publicly, underwrites or deals in securities other
than exempted or municipal securities, or receives transaction-related com-
pensation for brokerage services for accounts to which the bank provides ad-
vice, would not qualify for the bank exemption under the Exchange Act and
thus would be subject to SEC regulation.8 For example, numerous banks of-
fering publicly advertised brokerage services no longer would be exempt from
the SEC registration requirements. 89 Since proposed rule 3b-9 would place
broker-dealers and many bank securities services under the same regulations,
proposed rule 3b-9 would help assure investors using bank securities services
of SEC regulatory protection and would end the competitive advantage that
banks have enjoyed over broker-dealers.90
The SEC claims that proposed rule 3b-9 is necessary to assure investor
protection, to maintain a fair and orderly securities market, and to provide
effective regulation of the securities market.9 1 Since rule 3b-9 would subject
87. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326 (only banks performing
specified securities activities must register with SEC under proposed rule 3b-9). Proposed rule
3b-9 would provide that banks engaged in three securities activities would no longer be termed
"banks" for purposes of the Exchange Act and, therefore, would have to register with the SEC
as brokers. Id.; supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (brokers and dealers must register with
SEC but definitions of broker and dealer exclude banks). First, the proposed rule would require
banks that engage in the public solicitation of brokerage services to register with the SEC. See
SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,328. Numerous banks today which publically
promote the bank's discount brokerage services, therefore, would be subject to SEC regulation.
Under the proposed rule, banks performing limited accommodation services would not have to
register with the SEC if the banks did not publically solicit the accommodation services. See
id. Secondly, the proposed rule would provide that banks which receive transaction-related com-
pensation for providing brokerage services for trusts, or as managing agency, or for accounts
to which the bank provides investment advice could no longer take advantage of the Exchange
Act bank exclusion. See id. The SEC realizes that the propriety of banks providing investment
advice is an unsettled issue, and thus the SEC expresses no opinion concerning the legality of
banks providing investment advice. See id. n.16; supra note 6 (legality of bank investment advisory
service debatable). Finally, the proposed rule mandates that any bank which underwrites or deals
in securities other than exempted or municipal securities would be subject to SEC regulation.
See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,328. Banks dealing in municipal securities
presently must register with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(4)(a) (1982) (municipal securities dealer
must register with SEC). Broker-dealers effecting transactions in only exempted securities, however,
are exempt for registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(3)(b) (1982) (registration requirements of Ex-
change Act do not apply to broker or dealer in exempted securities).
88. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326 (banks performing listed
activities subject to SEC registration under proposed rule); supra note 87 (discussion of bank
securities activities subjecting banks to SEC regulation under proposed rule 3b-9).
89. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326 (SEC proposed rule 3b-9
would require banks soliciting brokerage business to register with SEC).
90. See id. (SEC believes rule 3b-9 would assure reasonably complete and effective regula-
tion of securities market).
91. See id. (SEC contends rule 3b-9 is necessary to protect investors and create a fair securities
market).
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banks engaged in specified securities activities to SEC regulation, identical
standards would control both bank and broker-dealer securities activities."
The SEC reasons that a change in the Exchange Act is appropriate because
Congress did not foresee that banks would perform the kinds of securities
activities that banks offer today when Congress enacted the bank exclusion
to the Exchange Act's definitions of broker and dealer. 93 The SEC notes that
banks now provide brokerage services that are identical to the services that
registered broker-dealers traditionally have offered. 9' Moreover, the SEC con-
tends that no authority exists that Congress intended to exempt institutions
offering extensive securities services from SEC registration."
The SEC relies on introductory language to the Exchange Act's defimi-
tional section which states that the Act's definitions are applicable "unless
the context otherwise requires" for legal authority to exclude banks offering
extensive securities services for the Exchange Act's definition of a bank.9 6 The
92. See id. (banks offering securities activities that proposed rule 3b-9 lists would be sub-
ject to same rules and regulations as broker-dealers performing same activities).
93. See id. at 86,327 (SEC claims that Congress did not contemplate that banks would
engage in the securities activities that the proposed rule cites when Congress enacted the bank
exclusion). The SEC notes that, although the legislative history of the Exchange Act's bank ex-
clusion is not extensive, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not foresee that
banks would offer the types of securities services that banks offer today. See id. n.12; see also
Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87, 686-87 (1934) reprinted in 8, 9 J. ELLENBEROER & E. MAHAR,
LEGis.ATrvE HISTORY OF THE SEcu~rrEs ACT OF 1933 AND SEcuRIS ExcHAN E ACT OF 1934,
item 23 (1973) (statement of Thomas C. Corcoran, one of drafters of Exchange Act). The legislative
history concerning the bank exclusion emphasizes that Congress did not intend a bank that mere-
ly acts as agent in effecting securities transaction should not fall under SEC regulation. See id.
at 86. The legislative history, however, shows that Congress viewed bank securities activities as
extremely limited. See id. Congress believed banks could only transmit a customer order to a
broker, but banks could not carry on the business of dealing in securities. See id. The scant
legislative history of the bank exclusion in the Exchange Act, therefore, supports the SEC's posi-
tion that Congress did not believe that banks would engage in the general brokerage business
similar to the activities of registered broker-dealers. See id.
94. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 (some bank services in-
distinguishable from broker-dealer services); supra note 1 (discussion of securities services banks
offer).
95. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 (SEC notes that no evidence
exists that Congress intended to exempt banks performing same functions as brokers from SEC
registration); see also supra note 93 (Exchange Act's legislative history shows Congress envision-
ed only limited securities activities for banks). The SEC emphasizes that banks have expanded
their securities services considerably since the 1977 Bank Study. See id. at 86,327. Although the
Bank Study rejected a proposal to delete the Exchange Act's bank exclusion, the SEC contends
that the Study's conclusion that banks offering securities services should not have to register
with the SEC resulted from the limited nature of bank securities activities at the time of the
Study. See Bank Study, supra note 41, at 343. Accordingly, the SEC recognized that increased
securities activities by banks could affect the SEC's conclusions. See id.; supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text (SEC's conclusions and recommendations in Bank Study).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1982); see SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326-27
(SEC claims language of Exchange Act provides SEC authority to redefine "banks" for purposes
of Exchange Act's bank exclusion).
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SEC maintains that this introductory language, coupled with the SEC's
authorization to define terms in the Act if the SEC's definition is consistent
with the Act's purposes,97 provides sufficient authority for the SEC to redefine
the term "bank" for purposes of the Exchange Act's bank exclusion.98 The
SEC reasons that Congress designed the Exchange Act's registration re-
quirements to provide effective regulation of the securities market and excluded
banks from the Act's registration requirement because Congress believed banks
would engage in only limited securities activities." Since banks now offer
securities services comparable to broker-dealer services, the SEC contends that
the policy of investor protection requires the SEC to regulate banks offering
extensive securities services.' 00
To support the SEC's plan to expand the SEC's regulatory authority of
securities activities to encompass banks engaged in extensive securities services,
the SEC relies on Marine Bank v. Weaver.'0 The SEC cites Weaver for the
proposition that the SEC may examine factors outside the Exchange Act, such
as the current regulatory scheme of bank securities activities in light of the
congressional intent of assuring investor protection by providing SEC regula-
tion of substantial securities activities, to determine whether banks engaged
in substantial securities activities fall within the bank exclusion to the Exchange
Act's definitions of broker and dealer. °0 In Weaver, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a bank certificate of deposit is a security within
the meaning of the Exchange Act and thus subject to the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws. 0 3 Although the Court recognized that the
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 3b (1982) (SEC has authority to define terms in Exchange Act if consis-
tent with purposes of Act).
98. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326-27 (SEC explains legal
justification for proposed rule 3b-9).
99. See id. at 86,327.
100. See id.
101. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
102. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 n.15 (SEC cites Weaver
for legal authority to adopt rule 3b-9).
103. See 455 U.S. at 555. (Supreme Court held certificate of deposit not a security for pur-
poses of antifraud provisions of federal securities laws). In Marine Bank v. Weaver, the Weavers
pledged a federally insured certificate of deposit as security for a loan from Marine Bank (Marine)
to the Columbus Packing Company (Columbus) and guaranteed Columbus' loan. Id. at 533.
The Weavers' contract with Columbus provided that the Weavers would receive 50% of Colum-
bus' net profits and $100 a month for guaranteeing the loan. Id. Columbus, however, owed money
to Marine. Id. The Weavers believed that Columbus would use the loan as working capital, but
instead Marine applied a portion of the loan to pay Columbus' debt. Id. The Weavers claimed
that Marine encouraged them to guarantee Columbus' loan without disclosing that Columbus
owed debts to Marine or without disclosing Marine's intentions to apply the proceeds of the
loan to repay Columbus' overdue obligations. Id. at 554. Columbus later became bankrupt to
Marine. Id. at 553-54. The Weavers claimed that the bank violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act
by deceiving the Weavers with respect to Columbus' loan. Id. Section 10b of the Exchange Act.
prohibits manipulative or deceptive practices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. at 554; see 15 U.S.C. § 780)(b) (1982) (Section 10b of Exchange Act). The Supreme Court
held that the certificate of deposit was not a security for purposes of the Exchange Act and,
consequently, denied the Weavers relief of their federal securities laws claims. See 455 U.S. at 559.
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Exchange Act's definition of security includes instruments commonly considered
to be within the concept of security in the commercial world, the Court con-
cluded that the bank certificate of deposit in Weaver was not a security for
purposes of the Exchange Act.'04 The Court noted that the Exchange Act defini-
tions do not apply if the "context otherwise requires.""'° Consequently, the
Court examined factors outside the Exchange Act's definition of security to
determine if Congress intended instruments such as bank certificates of deposits
to qualify as securities and, therefore, receive the protection of the federal
securities laws.'0 6 The Court stated that, unlike common securities, federal
banking regulations and federal insurance already protect the deposits of holders
of certificates of deposits. 107 According to the Court, the "unless the context
otherwise requires" language in the Exchange Act mandated a finding that
a bank certificate of deposit, which seemed to fall within the Exchange Act's
definition of a security, was not a security because banking regulations out-
side the Exchange Act already adequately protect certificate holders against
fraud.' 0 The SEC relies on Weaver to argue that since Congress did not in-
tend the banks to engage in extensive securities activities without SEC regula-
tion, the SEC may find that banks offering substantial securities services do
not fall within the bank exclusion in the Exchange Act. 0 9
In addition to Weaver, the SEC relies on Securities and Exchange Com-
mission v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company of America" 0 to sup-
104. See id. at 559. (Supreme Court held certificate of deposit in Weaver not security). In
Weaver, the Supreme Court examined the Exchange Act's definition of security and prior court
decisions interpreting the Act's definition of security to determine if the certificate of deposit
fell within the definition of security. See 455 U.S. at 555-59; 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(I0) (1982) (Exchange
Act's definition of security). The court noted that the Exchange Act's definition of "security"
is extremely broad and generally applies to instruments that, in the commercial world, have a
character falling within the ordinary concept of security. See 455 U.S. at 556. The Court, however,
noted that the definitions in the Exchange Act apply "unless the context otherwise requires."
See id. The Court, therefore, reasoned that a certificate of deposit which has characteristics of
a security should not be termed a security if the context otherwise requires. See id. at 558-59.
The Court then noted that the debt represented by a certificate of deposit, unlike a common
security such as a long-term debt obligation, receives protection from the regulations of the federal
bank agencies and federal deposit insurance. See id. at 557-58. Holders of federally secured cer-
tificates of deposit, therefore, do not need the protection of the federal securities laws to assure
payment. See id. at 558. The Court thus concluded that a bank certificate of deposit is not a
security under the Exchange Act because the holders of certificates of deposit receive adequate
protection under the federal banking laws. See id. at 559.
105. See id. at 556. (Weaver Court stated that consideration of "unless the context otherwise
requires" language important in determining scope of Exchange Act definitions).
106. See id. at 556-59 (Court examined federal banking laws applicable to certificates of deposit
to determine whether certificates of deposit were securities).
107. See id. at 558 (banks issuing certificates of deposit are subject to comprehensive federal
regulations and bank deposits are federally insured).
108. See id. at 558-59 (unnecessary to include certificates of deposit in Exchange Act's definition
of security because federal banking laws already protect deposits).
109. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 n.13 (SEC cites Weaver
to support SEC's authority to promulgate proposed rule 3b-9).
110. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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port the proposition that the SEC has legal authority to change the Exchange
Act's definition of a bank."' In Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, the
Court considered whether variable annuity contracts were securities under the
Securities Act of 1933 or whether the contracts were life insurance contracts.'
1 2
The Court held that the contracts were securities subject to the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.1' In a concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan maintained that the scope of exclusions to the federal securities laws
depends on the regulatory purposes of the federal securities laws."" The SEC
relies on Justice Brennan's concurrence in Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company to argue that the SEC must examine the scope of the bank exclu-
sion in the Exchange Act in light of the Exchange Act's purpose of assuring
investor protection by subjecting extensive securities activities to SEC
regulation."' Since banks now engage in extensive securities activities beyond
the activities that Congress envisioned when Congress enacted the bank exclu-
sion, the Exchange Act's regulatory purpose of providing protection to securities
investors mandates rule 3b-9's proposed modification to the Act's definition
of bank so that substantial bank securities activities will be subject to the SEC
registration requirements. ' 6
The SEC's legal basis for proposed rule 3b-9 is questionable. Sections
I11. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 n.13 (SEC cites Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Company for proposition that scope of exclusion to federal securities
laws depends on purposes of securities laws); 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.).
112. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). In SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., the SEC sought to enjoin the defendants from offering so-called "annuity
contracts" to the public without registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).
See id. at 67. The defendants claimed that the contracts were insurance or annuity contracts
and, therefore, exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act. See id. at 67.
The Court held that the contracts were securities even though the contracts were termed "in-
surance" or "annuity" contracts because the investment features of the contracts more closely
resembled risk securities than insurance. See id. at 69-73.
113. See id. (Court held contracts were securities subject to registration requirements of
Securities Act).
114. See id. at 76 (Brennan argued that Court must analyze regulatory and protective pur-
poses of federal securities laws to determine application of securities laws).
115. See SEC Bank Regulation Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 n.13 (SEC's case support
for proposed rule 3b-9). The SEC contends that the purpose of the registration requirements
in the Exchange Act is to protect investors by providing effective regulation of the securities
market. See id. at 86,327. The SEC believes that Congress exempted banks from the registration
requirements of the Exchange Act because of the limited nature of bank securities activities. See
id. Relying on Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, however, the SEC may argue that
the scope of the bank exclusion to the definitions of broker and dealer in the Exchange Act
depends on the congressional purpose in enacting the bank exclusion. See id. at 86,327 n.19.
Consequently, since banks now engage in substantial securities activities which frustrate the pur-
pose underlying the bank exclusion, the SEC may need to redefine the term "bank" for purposes
of the bank exclusion. See id. at 86,327. Under proposed rule 3b-9, the SEC will regulate banks
engaging in substantial securities activities and thus provide effective regulation of the securites
market. See id. At the same time, rule 3b-9 will maintain the bank exclusion for banks that
only offer accommodation services as contemplated by Congress when it enacted the bank exclu-
sion. See id.
116. See id. (SEC needs to regulate substantial bank securities activities to assure effective
regulation of securities market).
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3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act clearly exclude banks from SEC regula-
tion by excluding banks from the Exchange Act's definitions of broker and
dealer."17 The SEC cites no authority to directly support the proposition that
the SEC has the power to amend a clear statutory exemption without congres-
sional approval."8 Furthermore, the cases that the SEC relies on do not sup-
port necessarily the SEC's position." 9 For example, the Court in Weaver relied
on factors outside the securities laws such as the bank regulatory system to
exclude certificates of deposit from the definition of security and, therefore,
narrowed the authority of the SEC because the SEC could not regulate cer-
tificate of deposit transactions.2 1 Weaver, thus, does not support the pro-
position that the SEC has discretion to examine factors outside the securities
laws to expand the SEC's regulatory authority.' 2' Proposed rule 3b-9 would
expand greatly the authority of the SEC by requiring many banks not sub-
jected presently to SEC authority to register with the SEC.2 2 Furthermore,
while the Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company decision supports the
proposition that the scope of exclusions in the federal securities laws depends
on the purposes of the securities laws, the case does not grant the SEC the
power to expand its regulatory authority by deleting an express statutory
exemption under the federal securities laws. 23 Therefore, neither the language
of lhe Exchange Act nor the cases cited by the SEC provide conclusive authority
for the proposition that the SEC may change the Exchange Act's definition
of bank and require banks engaged in substantial securities activities to register
with the SEC.
124
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1982) (definitions of broker and dealer in Exchange Act
expressly exclude banks).
118. See Letter from Douglas Ginsburg to SEC 8-9 (Dec. 30, 1983) (comment letter from
Justice Department to SEC concerning proposed rule 3b-9) [hereinafter cited as Justice Letter].
The Justice Department's comment letter on proposed rule 3b-9 concludes that the SEC's authority
to promulgate rule 3b-9 is unclear because the SEC has no express authority to modify Exchange
Act definitions to expand the SEC's regulatory authority. See id. Additionally, the Justice Depart-
ment believes that the SEC's authority to issue rule 3b-9 is questionable because no cases exist
that directly support the SEC's position. See id. Consequently, the Justice Department contends
that the SEC's reliance on statutory authority for rule 3b-9 raises doubts about the SEC's legal
authority to promulgate the proposed rule. See id.
119. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (discussion of weaknesses in SEC's case
support for authority to promulgate proposed rule 3b-9).
120. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558-59 (Court examined federal banking laws protecting deposits
to determine that certificate of deposit is not security); supra notes 103-10 and accompanying
text (discussion of Weaver).
121. See Letter from James D. Herrington to SEC 2 (Dec. 29, 1983) (comment letter from
Independent Bankers Association of America (IBAA) to SEC) (IBAA argued Weaver does not
give SEC authority to expand SEC's regulatory authority).
122. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 (proposed rule 3b-9 will
subject banks engaging in securities activities of type described by the proposed rule to SEC
regulatory requirements).
123. See Justice Letter, supra note 118, at 8-9. (Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. does not
directly support SEC's claim that it has authority to delete express statutory exemption in Exchange
Act).
124. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text (SEC's legal authority to promulgate
proposed rule 3b-9 is doubtful).
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Although the SEC's authority to amend the Exchange Act's bank exclu-
sion is unclear, the Exchange Act's underlying policy of investor protection
supports action by the SEC.'25 Congress enacted the Exchange Act's require-
ment that the SEC regulate broker-dealers to protect investors. 26 Congress
excluded banks from the Act's definitions of broker and dealer because Con-
gress believed that the Glass-Steagall Act only permitted banks to engage in
extremely limited securities services.' 27 Now that banks provide securities ser-
vices that are identical to broker-dealers, the SEC should regulate bank
securities activities to assure equality of regulation between banks and
broker-dealers.' 2 8 If all of the rules and regulations of the Exchange Act are
necessary for the protection of investors, then the rules and regulations should
apply equally to substantial securities services regardless of whether a bank
or broker-dealer effects the securities transaction.'29 Proposed rule 3b-9,
therefore, would protect investors by uniformly regulating both banks and
broker-dealers offering extensive securities services. 31 Proposed rule 3b-9 would
be consistent with the Glass-Steagall Act, however, because the Exchange Act
would continue to exempt banks that offer only limited brokerage service as
an accommodation to their customers from SEC registration because banks
performing only limited brokerage services would continue to come within
the Exchange Act's bank exclusion to the definitions of broker and dealer.'
3
Since the SEC does have limited legal support for proposed rule 3b-9, in the
absence of congressional action, the proposed rule would provide necessary
protection to investors in the securities market by equalizing the regulatory
schemes of bank and broker-dealer securities activities."3 2 Immediate action
by the SEC through rule 3b-9 would provide adequate regulation of bank
125. See Letter from Matthew P. Fink to George A. Fitzsimmons 4-5 (Dec. 29, 1983) (com-
ment letter from Investment Company Institute to SEC concerning proposed rule 3b-9). In a
comment letter to the SEC, the Investment Company Institute (ICI) argues that Congress never
intended to permit banks to engage in the brokerage business to the extent that banks participate
today. See id. at 3. The ICI, therefore, maintains that banks violate the Glass-Steagall Act by
offering extensive securities activities. See id. at 3-4. The ICI believes that the SEC should bring
actions to force banks to cease the bank brokerage services that banks offer today. See id. at
4. As a secondary measure, the ICI argues that the SEC's duty to protect investors in the securities
market mandates the SEC to require banks to register as broker-dealers. See id. at 4. Without
SEC regulation, the ICI claims that bank securities customers will not receive adequate protec-
tion in securities transactions. See id.
126. See L. Loss, supra note 9, at 684-85 (statutory regulation necessary to protect investors).
127. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (SEC argues that Congress enacted bank
exclusion on premise that banks permitted to engage in few securities activities).
128. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,327 (SEC argues that increas-
ed bank securities activities requires SEC regulation).
129. See id. at 86,326 (SEC argues that banks and broker-dealers performing same activities
should be subject to same regulations).
130. See id. (proposed rule 3b-9 would protect investors).
131. See id. at 86,328 (banks could perform orders handling services for customers without
registering as broker-dealers).
132. See id. at 86,326 (proposed rule would protect investors through equivalent regulation
of bank and broker-dealer securities services); supra notes 96-116 (discussion of SEC's legal justifica-
tion for proposed rule 3b-9).
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securities activities until Congress enacts a solution to the problem of inade-
quate regulation of extensive bank securities activities.
3
Like the SEC, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)'34
has refused to wait for Congress to act and has proposed an amendment to
the NASD By-Laws which would require some bank employees to register
with the NASD as NASD representatives subject to NASD regulations.13 The
NASD is a private self-regulatory organization whose rules govern all over-
the-counter securities transactions, whether or not the transaction is effected
by a stock exchange member.' 36 The proposed NASD By-Laws amendment
would require bank employees who solicit or receive orders from bank
customers for the purchase or sale of a security and who, because of a con-
tractual arrangement with a NASD member, refer the transaction to the NASD
member in return for compensation, to register as representatives of the NASD
133. See SEC Bank Registration Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326 (SEC supports congres-
sional action but believes proposed rule 3b-9 necessary to protect investors pending action by
Congress). While proposed rule 3b-9 would help protect securities investors pending congres-
sional action, problems exist with the SEC's plans to subject bank securities activities to SEC
regulation through proposed rule 3b-9. For example, the SEC's plan would place responsibility
for regulation of bank securities activities with the SEC, thereby creating duplicative regulation
of banks securities activities since banks would also be subject to regulation by the banking agen-
cies. See Letter from James D. Herrington to SEC 2 (Dec. 29, 1983) (comment letter of Indepen-
dent Bankers Association of America (IBAA) to SEC concerning rule 3b-9). Moreover, passage
of rule 3b-9 apparently would create conflicts between banking agencies and the SEC. See id.
The mere proposal of rule 3b-9 has caused significant tension between the SEC and federal bank-
ing regulators. See SEC Rush on Turf Ruffled Regulators of Bank Agencies, Legal Times, Nov.
14, 1983, at 1.
Another problem with proposed rule 3b-9 concerns how the proposed rule will affect small
banks or banks that offer a limited amount of securities business. See SEC Bank Registration
Proposal, supra note 5, at 86,326 (small bank may suffer hardship under rule). The SEC has
requested comments on whether to exclude from rule 3b-9 banks that limit their securities activities
to referrals of bank customers to registered broker-dealers or banks that engage in only a small
number of securities transactions. See id. at 86,328. While the banking industry supports an ex-
clusion from rule 3b-9 of banks that offer only limited securities services, the securities industry
contends that banks should not escape registration with the SEC when broker-dealers engaging
in similar activities must register. See Letter from Edward I. O'Brien to George A. Fitzsimmons
4 (Dec. 23, 1983) (comment letter from Securities Industry Association to SEC concerning pro-
posed rule 3b-9). The securities industry claims that the minimal cost of SEC registration should
not justify an exemption for banks with a small securities business. See id.
134. The NASD is a self-regulatory agency governing the over-the-counter securities market.
See S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEAIsRs AND SEcusnmas MARYTEis 239 (1977). Although not required,
most broker-dealers serving the public are members of the NASD. L. Loss, supra note 9, at
674. The NASD By-Laws require that persons that the NASD By-Laws term "representatives"
must register with the NASD. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1102A, at 1052 (1983) (NASD By-Laws
require representatives to register with the NASD). A representative is a person engaged in the
securities business for a member. See id. Under the NASD By-Laws, representatives must pass
qualification examinations and must adhere to NASD rules and regulations. See id. at 1052-54
(NASD qualification standards).
135. NASD NoncE TO MEmBERs 83-72 (Dec. 20, 1983) (containing text of proposed amend-
ments to NASD By-Laws).




member.' 3 7 Furthermore, bank employees who give customers investment ad-
vice subject to an agreement between the bank and the NASD member where
the member compensates the bank or the bank employee for any orders received
as a result of the bank's advice would be required to register as
representatives.' 38 Under the NASD By-Laws, a person required to register
as a representative of a NASD member must adhere to NASD rules and is
subject to disciplinary action for violations of the organization's rules.' 39
Registered representatives also must meet qualification standards including pass-
ing a written qualification examination.'4 0 The only persons that the NASD
By-Laws presently require to register are persons, such as employees of
members, who solicit or conduct business in securities for a member and who
the member directly compensates for those activities.' The NASD's propos-
ed amendment, therefore, would extend the definition of representative to in-
clude persons who, if they were employees of members, would be represen-
tatives and required to register with the NASD.' 2 Since NASD members have
supervisory responsibility for their representatives, the effect of the proposed
amendment would be to require the NASD member to register the bank
employee as a representative of the member." 3 The proposed amendment would
affect banks because a bank employee who solicits or receives customer orders
or who provides investment advice in connection with an agreement with a
137. See NASD NOTICE TO MEumEis 83-72, at 2-3 (Dec. 20, 1983). Under the NASD's pro-
posal to amend the NASD By-Laws, securities employees of banks would have to register with
the NASD representatives if the bank maintains a relationship with a NASD member where the
bank agrees to refer the bank's customers to the NASD member for execution of securities trans-
actions and the member agrees to compensate the bank or the bank securities employee. See
id. at 3. Recently, many banks have entered the discount brokerage business, for example, through
joint ventures with broker-dealers. See Comptroller's New Reading, supra note 1, at 1313. Often
these banks establish a relationship with the broker-dealer whereby the bank transmits customer
orders to the broker-dealer and receives compensation for the service. See Letter from James
D. Herrington to George Fitzsimmons (Dec. 29, 1983) (comment letter of IBHA to SEC concern-
ing proposed rule 3b-9). Under the NASD's proposed By-Laws amendment, therefore, many bank
securities personnel would have to register with the NASD as registered representatives of the
NASD member with whom the bank has a compensation agreement. See NASD NoTIcE To MMMERs
83-72, at 3 (Dec. 20, 1983).
138. See NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 83-72, at 4 (Dec. 20, 1983) (NASD proposal encom-
passes bank personnel who give investment advice or make securities investment recommenda-
tions to public customers).
139. See id. at 2 (NASD representatives subject to same obligations as NASD members).
140. See NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1 102A, at 1055 (1983) (NASD By-Law's section governing
qualification examinations for registered agents).
141. See id. at 1052 (definition of representative). The NASD By-Laws presently define
"representative" as a person engaged in the investment banking or securities business for a NASD
member "including the functions of supervision, solicitaion, or conduct of business in securities."
Id. The NASD has applied the definition, however, only to persons directly compensated by
NASD members for the representative's securities activities. See NSAD NoTcE To MEamEis 83-72,
at 2 (Dec. 20, 1983).
142. See NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 83-72, at 2 (Dec. 20, 1983) (NASD proposal would
encompass bank employees who would be representatives if NASD member employees).
143. See id. at 4 (NASD member must register bank securities employees as representatives
to assure investors protection under NASD rules and federal securities laws).
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NASD member, would be subject to NASD qualification standards and sub-
ject 'to disciplinary action for violations of NASD rules.'
44
The NASD contends that to effectively regulate the over-the-counter
securities market, any bank employee that solicits or receives securities business
for NASD members where the member later compensates the bank should
be subject to NASD qualification examinations and NASD rules.' 4 The NASD,
therefore, maintains that the public interest requires that bank employees who
perform the same functions as employees of NASD members should be sub-
ject to NASD rules and regulations.'"1 The NASD also claims that the pro-
posed amendment would increase investor protection in the securities market
by assuring that bank employees within the amended definition of represen-
tative meet NASD qualifications standards.'
41
The NASD proposed amendment is another positive step towards assur-
ing more complete and equitable regulation of the securities market.' 1 Bank
employees who perform similar services as NASD representatives should be
subject to equivalent regulations to assure investor protection.' 4, Presently,
bank employees who solicit securities business in connection with an arrange-
ment with a registered broker-dealer are not subject to NASD qualification
144. See id. (scope of NASD proposal covers some bank employees and subjects bank
employees to NASD rules and standards).
145. See id. at 3-4 (NASD argues that bank securities employees should register with NASD
to assure investor protection). The NASD limits the extension of the definition of "represen-
tative" in the NASD's proposed amendment to employees of financial institutions who engage
in the activities which the proposal cites and where the financial institution has entered into an
arrangement with a NASD member by which the bank employee's activity furthers the securities
business of the NASD member. See id. Bank employees, therefore, must perform the securities
services on behalf of NASD members before the NASD proposal would require the bank employee
to register with the NASD. See id. The NASD maintains that bank employees who perform securities
business for NASD members should not be exempt from NASD rules and qualification standards
simply because the bank employees are not employees of the NASD member. See id. The NASD
believes that banks' increased securities activities in recent years warrants the proposed amend-
ment because presently no restrictions exist on the ability of bank personnel to engage in the
activities normally performed by NASD registered representatives. See id.
146. See id. at 3 (impact on public on person soliciting or receiving business for member
or for compensation is same if person is employee of NASD member or employee of bank).
147. See id. (lack of qualification standards for bank securities employees could expose bank
securities customer to risk of harm). The NASD registration requirement resulting from the NASD's
proposed amendment would not impose qualification standards on all bank employees engaged
in the securities business. See id. at 4-5. For example, bank employees transacting securities business
with a NASD member that does not result in compensation other than a set fee by the member
to the bank would not have to register as representatives with the NASD. See id. at 4. Employees
engaged in the conventional securities activities of banks, such as managing a bank's trust depart-
ment, also would not have to register with the NASD. See id. Additionally, the NASD proposal
does not apply to arrangements between NASD members and registered broker-dealers. See id. at 5.
148. See id. at 3 (NASD proposal would promote equitable securities trade and help protect
investors and public interest); infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text (arguing NASD proposal
helpful in effectively regulating securities market).
149. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (personnel performing same securities
services should be subject to equivalent regulation).
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standards.1 0 If the bank employee performed the same function but was an
employee of the broker-dealer instead of the bank, the employee would be
a representative of the broker-dealer and required to register with the NASD."'
In fact, the NASD proposal may not go far enough since bank employees
who supervise the bank's securities personnel would not fall within the NASD's
proposed new definition of representative. 52 The securities industry believes
that the NASD By-Laws should require bank supervisors of bank securities
personnel to register with the NASD since presently, supervisors of NASD
representatives must register with the NASD. 5 3 Registration of bank employees
responsible for the supervision of bank securities personnel, therefore, would
equalize NASD regulation of bank and broker-dealer securities personnel. 5
Moreover, under the NASD's present proposal to extend the definition of
representative, NASD members apparently have responsibility for assuring that
the bank employees comply with NASD regulations. 5 5 Since the bank securities
personnel and the NASD members operate separate business entities, the NASD
members will have difficulty supervising the bank securities personnel.1
5 6 If
bank supervisors were registered with the NASD, the bank supervisors would
be responsible for overseeing their own bank securities personnel to assure
compliance with NASD rules and regulations.' 57 In order to further the goal
150. See NASD NOnTcE To MEmBERs 83-72, at 4 (Dec. 20, 1983) (proposal only covers
employees of bank who would be NASD representative if they were employees of NASD member).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 2 (NASD proposal only affects bank employees who solicit or receive securities
business or who offer securities advice on behalf of member). Under the NASD By-Laws, the
definition of "representative" includes a person who engages in the securities business and func-
tions as a supervisor in an association with a NASD member. See NASD MAuNA (CCH) 1102A,
at 1052 (1983) (definition of representative). A person who supervises securities personnel for
a NASD member, therefore, also has to register with the NASD. See id. Under the NASD's
proposal, however, bank employees responsible for the supervision of bank securities personnel
would not have to register as representatives with the NASD. See NASD NOTICE TO MEMBEs
83-72, at 4 (Dec. 20, 1983) (only bank employees acting in furtherance of arrangement with NASD
member required to register under NASD proposal).
153. See Letter from Donald J. Crawford to S. William Broka 2-3 (Jan. 11, 1984) (Security
Industry Associations's (SIA) comment letter to NASD concerning NASD's proposed amend-
ment to By-Laws) (arguing that NASD definition of representative should include bank personnel
who supervise employees engaged in securities business) [hereinafter cited as Crawford letter].
The SIA contends in its comment letter concerning the proposed amendment to the NASD By-
Laws that the supervisory personnel of bank employees would have to register with the NASD
if the supervisors were employees of NASD members instead of the bank. The SIA, therefore,
claims that to equalize regulations the NASD should require bank supervisory personnel to register
with the NASD as representatives. See id.
154. See id. (registration of bank securities personnel supervisor necessary for effective regula-
tion of securities market).
155. See NASD NoTicE To MNEMBERs 83-72, at 3-4 (Dec. 20, 1983) (NASD proposal requires
NASD members to register and be responsible for bank securities personnel).
156. See Crawford letter, supra note 153, at 2-3 (securities industry argues NASD proposal
unrealistic in that it requires NASD member employees to supervise bank personnel in another
office).
157. See id. at 2 (SIA notes that bank supervisors better able to supervise their employees
than NASD member supervisors).
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of increased consumer protection, therefore, the NASD should modify the
amendment to include within the definition of representative nonmember
employees responsible for the supervision of the activities of nonmember
securities personnel.
158
Bank involvement in the securities market has increased in recent years
to a level where some action is necessary to assure effective regulation of bank
securities activities. 59 While the courts have not determined the permissible
scope of bank securities activities under the Glass-Steagall Act, banks un-
doubtedly will continue to be active participants in the securities market.'60
In order to assure protection for bank securities customers, bank securities
activities should be subject to the same regulation as broker-dealer services.' 6 '
Presently, however, the regulatory schemes controlling bank and broker-dealer
securities activities vary. 26 Congressional legislation requiring banks to con-
duct all substantial bank securities activities through a bank holding company
would end the problem of disparate regulation between banks and broker-
dealers because the SEC would regulate the securities activities of the holding
company affiliate."6 Absent congressional action, the SEC's proposed rule
3b-9 would help to assure that most bank and broker-dealer securities activities
receive equal regulatory treatment. 164 Although the SEC's legal authority to
adopt its proposed rule is questionable, the rule represents positive action to
equalize the regulation of bank and broker-dealer securities activities. 16
Similarly, the NASD's proposal to amend its By-Laws would help assure in-
vestor protection and equality of regulation by requiring bank securities per-
sonnel to register with the NASD as representatives subject to the NASD's
rules and regulations. 6 The NASD should consider amending its proposal,
however, to require that bank supervisors of bank securities personnel also
register as representatives with the NASD." 7 While congressional action would
assure a more complete solution to the problem of the inadequate regulation
of bank securities activities," 8 passage of congressional legislation could take
158. See id. at 3 (securities industry recommends change in NASD proposal to require bank
supervisors of securities employees to register with NASD as representatives).
159. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing recent increase in banks securities
activities).
160. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (present debate concerning permissible bank
securities activities).
161. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (interest of investor protection mandates
equivalent regulation for equivalent securities services).
162. See supra notes 22-35, 49-52 and accompanying text (disparities exist between regula-
tion of bank and broker-dealers securities activities).
163. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (placing bank securities activities in bank
holding company subsidiary under SEC regulation would help assure equality of regulation and
investor protection).
164. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (discussion of SEC's proposed rule 3b-9).
165. See supra notes 96-133 and accompanying text (discussion of SEC's legal authority for
proposed rule 3b-9).
166. See supra notes 134-51 and accompanying text (discussion of NASD proposal).
167. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (suggested change in NASD proposal).
168. See supra notes 8-52 and accompanying text (comparison of regulation of bank and
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time. Meanwhile, the adoption of the SEC's proposed rule 3b-9 or the NASD's
proposed By-Laws amendment would further the Exchange Act's purpose of
protecting investors in the securities market by equalizing the regulatory con-
trol on bank and broker-dealer securities activities.' 69
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broker-dealer securities services); supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text (proposed Deregula-
tion Act).
169. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (SEC's proposed rule 3b-9 would help
equalize bank and broker-dealer securities regulation); supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text
(NASD proposal would equalize securities regulation and help insure investor protection).

